Institutional Reform of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia: Decentralization for Systemic Impartiality and Accountability

The purpose of the policy document is to critically understand the Georgian Prosecutor's Office's institutional situation and evolution trajectory in the framework created by the existing theoretical and comparative knowledge about the institutional arrangement of prosecutor's offices in constitutional democracies.

The first part of the policy document is divided into three chapters. The first chapter discusses the vital normative principles of the organizational arrangement of the prosecutor's office in constitutional democracies. In particular, the content of the principles of independence and accountability of the prosecutor's office is analyzed, including the importance of balance and the forms of institutional design that try to solve this balance in their way.

The second chapter discusses the institutional arrangement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia and its evolution from when it gained sovereignty from the USSR to the present day. The reforms' focus on de jure institutional independence and neglect of accountability deficits are critically analyzed.

The third chapter discusses alternative mechanisms for achieving actual independence, high accountability, and systemic political impartiality in the Prosecutor's Office's various institutional arrangements from a comparative perspective.

The second part of the policy document proposes reforming the institutional arrangement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia based on the findings and conclusions of the first part.

Note: The full document is available only in Georgian.


Davit Zedelashvili, Tamar Ketsbaia